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COMMENT
THE INTER VIVOS RIGHTS OF COTENANTS INTER SE
The inter vivos rights and remedies among joint tenants with respect
to their common property are in general the same as those of other
co-owners of property. Differences become most apparent upon the
death of one tenant. During the period when all of the joint tenants
are alive, they are included in the general group, "cotenants," the
term for co-owners of property,' and their rights and remedies for the
most part fall within the rules governing co-tenants. Some exceptions
will be considered here.
One difference between the rules governing joint tenants and those
governing other co-owners is that while service of notice concerning
the common property normally binds only the tenant in common who
is served, service upon a joint tenant is notice to all of the tenants.2
Other differences center around the rule that cotenants of property
are usually in a relationship of trust and have a fiduciary duty toward
one another.'
Although it is sometimes held that tenants in common are not in a
relationship of mutual trust," historically, in equity, joint tenants,
because they hold under a common conveyance, are always in a position
of trust and confidence.' The fact that cotenants may not feel the
particular sentiment of a fiduciary relationship, since the co-ownership
may result by operation of law rather than from a voluntary formation,
makes little difference; most courts will nevertheless continue to find
the fiduciary relationship between them. The reasoning is clear: Since
the interest of each cotenant can only be advanced by the advancement
of all the tenants' interests, the natural presumption is that the act
of one is intended to benefit all.
I Caldwell v. Farrier, 248 S.W. 425 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923) ; 14 Am. JuR. Cotenancy§ 1 (1938) ; 7 R.C.L. Cotendncy §§ 1, 2 (1914).
2 Conrad v. Hawk, 122 Cal. App. 649, 10 P.2d 534 (Dist. Ct. App. 1932) ; Ellis v.
Columbine Creamery Co., 83 Cal. App. 48, 256 Pac. 489 (Dist. Ct. App. 1927) ; Detlor
v. Holland, 57 Ohio Dec. 492, 49 N.E. 690 (1898).
3 Cotton v. Cotton, 236 Ala. 459, 183 So. 442 (1938) ; Koch v. Kiron St. Bank, 230
Iowa 206, 297 N.W. 450 (1941); Mason v. Barrett, 295 Ky. 462, 174 S.W.2d 702
(1943) ; Chavez v. Chavez, 56 N.M. 393, 244 P.2d 781 (1952).
4 For cases holding that a confidential relationship does not exist between tenants
in common unless their interest in the land is the result of the same act or instrument or
by agreement, see Stevens v. Reynolds, 143 Ind. 467, 41 N.E. 931 (1895); Clark v.
Lindsey, 47 Ohio St. 437, 25 N.E. 422 (1890) ; Brokaw v. Richardson, 255 S.W. 685
(Tex. Civ. App. 1923) ; 14 Am. JUR. Cotenancy § 52 (1938).
5 FRmEMAX, COTFNANcy & PATiTioN § 151 (2d ed. 1886); 2 AmEcAN LAw oF
PRoPERTY § 6.16 (Casner ed. 1952).
CO TENANTS' RIGHTS INTER SE
Since a cotenant is entitled to possession of the entire property,
subject to the rights of his fellow tenants, one tenant may be in sole
possession and thus will be clothed with an important indicium of
title. Here the fiduciary relationship protects the other cotenants from
the possessing tenant's dealings with third parties. Also, the possessing
cotenant may be informed of infirmities in the common title, and it
would be inequitable to let him take advantage of his fellow tenants
because of his position. For this reason, it is normally held that the
fiduciary duty includes the duty of a tenant to protect the common
title.' This is not an affirmative duty, and it is taken to mean only
that the cotenant may clear the common title by purchasing outstand-
ing claims of third persons, but when he does, he must permit the other
cotenants to share in the acquisition.' Usually the purchasing cotenant
need only offer for a reasonable time to let the other cotenants share
by paying their respective portions'. The same rule is apparently ap-
plicable when, to protect the common property, the cotenant must
acquire other property. When one cotenant buys the interest of
another, the transaction is usually given the closest scrutiny by the
courts because of the fiduciary responsibility present.'"
Although joint tenants occupy a relationship of mutual trust, they
are not normally agents of one another, 1 and the actions of one tenant
concerning the common property are not binding upon the others,
unless they have previously authorized or subsequently ratified the
acts. The rule is somewhat modified, however, when the act is bene-
ficial to all of the tenants. 2
Many states have passed legislation preventing a person from bene-
fiting from the killing of his joint tenant. The Washington provision,
6 Breitman v. Jaehnal, 99 NJ. Eq. 243, 132 AUt. 291 (1926), aff'd mere., 100 N.J. Eq.
559, 135 At. 915 (1927).
7 Ruffil v. Crowell, 253 Ala. 653, 46 So. 2d 218 (1950) ; Spencer v. Spencer, 160
Fla. 749, 36 So. 2d 424 (1948) ; Robertson v. Gregsby, 41 So. 2d 860 (La. 1949);
Sperry v. Tolley, 114 Utah 303, 199 P2d 542 (1948) ; Dwight v. Waldron, 96 Wash.
156, 164 Pac. 761 (1917) ; Stone v. Marshall, 52 Wash. 375, 100 Pac. 858 (1909);
Burnett v. Kirk, 39 Wash. 45, 80 Pac. 855 (1905).
s Buchanan v. Pitts, 111 F.2d 599 (5th Cir. 1940) ; Markstein v. Schilleci, 258 Ala.
68, 61 So. 2d 75 (1952) ; Ammann v. Foster, 179 Okla. 44, 64 P.2d 653 (1937).
0 Cedar Canyon Consol. Mining Co. v. Yarwood, 27 Wash. 271, 67 Pac. 749 (1902).
10 Rose v. Roso, 119 Colo. 473, 204 P.2d 1075 (1949) ; Woodard v. Carpenter, 31
Wn.2d 271, 195 P2d 983 (1948).
Badger v. Boyd, 16 Tenn. App. 629, 65 S.W.2d 601 (1933) ; Rocky Mtn. Stud
Farm Co. v. Lunt, 46 Utah 299, 151 Pac. 521 (1915) ; 14 Am. JuRL Cotenancy § 4
(1938).
12 E.g., where one cotenant files an adverse claim for the benefit of himself and
one of the cotenants. Nesbitt v. DeLamar's Nevada Gold Mining Co., 24 Nev. 273,
52 Pac. 609 (1898), petition for cert. dismissed, 177 U.S. 523 (1900); 14 Ams. JuL.
Cotenancy § 82 (1938) ; 7 R.C.L. Cotenancy § 14 (1914).
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RCW 11.84.050, provides that upon the slaying of a joint tenant by a
cotenant, one-half of the common property passes immediately to the
decedent's estate, and the remainder at the time of the death of the
slayer.
RIGHT TO USE THE COMMON LAND
Joint tenants share a common estate in the land and each owns this
estate conjointly with the other tenants. While for some purposes
each joint tenant is considered a tenant of the whole of the common
premises (as in the cases of tenure and survivorship), for other pur-
poses (such as alienation and forfeiture), the tenant is considered as
having an undivided share in the common estate13 Generally, each
has equal rights to the possession and use of the real property, but
each tenant's rights are subject to the rights of his cotenants." Or-
dinarily, the possession of one tenant is the possession of all the co-
tenants," and one tenant in possession cannot restrain another tenant
from occupying the land and exercising his own rights of possession
and use."8 A tenant in sole possession, however, may use and occupy
the land, enjoying the common estate in the same manner as though
he were the sole proprietor." He may occupy and use the entire com-
mon property at all times, provided his fellow tenants do not make
claim to their own rights of use.'" Because each tenant's interest is in
the whole of the estate, one cotenant may not appropriate any particu-
lar portion of the estate for use during the existence of the joint owner-
ship, or upon partition of the common property.'
Joint tenants may make contracts between themselves concerning
the use of the common property," or concerning a division of the in-
come from the common property.2
13 2 AmERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY § 6.1 (Casner ed. 1952) ; 2 BLACxSTONE, Com-
MENTAMES *180-83; 2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 418 (3d ed. 1939).
4 Prairie Oil & Gas Co. v. Allen, 2 F.2d 566 (8th Cir. 1924) ; Howard v. Manning,
79 Okla. 165, 192 Pac. 358 (1920) ; De La Pole v. Lindley, 131 Wash. 354, 230 Pac.
144 (1924).
15 Struzinski v. Struzinsky, 133 Conn. 424, 52 A.2d 2 (1947) ; Barnard v. Pope, 14
Mass. 434 (1817).
16 Swartzbaugh v. Sampson, 11 Cal. App. 451, 54 P.2d 73 (Dist. Ct. App. 1936).
17 Morrison v. Clark, 89 Me. 103, 35 Atl. 1034 (1896); Pickering v. More, 67
N.H. 533, 32 Atl. 828 (1894).
18 Provident Life & Trust Co. v. Wood, 96 W. Va. 516, 123 S.E. 276 (1924) ; Silva
v. Helger, 75 R.I. 397, 67 A.2d 27 (1949).
19 Swartzbaugh v. Sampson, 11 Cal. App. 451, 54 P.2d 73 (Dist. Ct. App. 1936).
20 Spahn v. Spahn, 70 Cal. App. 2d 791, 162 P.2d 53 (Dist. Ct App. 1945) ; Tindall
v. Yeats, 392 Ill. 502, 64 N.E.2d 903 (1946) ; McGinley v. Cannon, 90 Wash. 311, 155
Pac. 1047 (1916).
21 Wells v. Wells, 64 Cal. App. 2d 113, 148 P.2d 126 (Dist. Ct. App. 1944).
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CONVEYANCES BY A COTENANT
Although each cotenant has an undivided share in the whole of the
common tract, and in each specific portion thereof during the existence
of the joint ownership, a conveyance by one cotenant of a particular
portion, purporting to represent his entire interest in the common
estate, is treated in some courts as having no effect on the other co-
tenants.22 The reasoning of these courts is that such a conveyance
operates to prejudice the rights of the other cotenants as it is an at-
tempt by one cotenant to create a new tenancy in common in a distinct
part of the common estate. Such conveyances are not allowed for the
additional reason that the cotenant's title is to an undivided share in
the whole of the estate, and he is not allowed to carve out his own part,
nor convey in such a manner as to compel his cotenants to take their
shares in several distinct parcels as he may please. This rule is followed
in some courts whether the interest sought to be conveyed is an actual
fee interest in a specific portion of the real estate, or rights to take
minerals,23 timber,24 or other incorporeal rights in the land.2" Such a
conveyance, however, is usually found to bind the grantor and those
holding under him by way of estoppel, if the grantor should ever get
a clear title to the particular portion that he conveyed.
Other courts treat a conveyance of a specific portion, representing
the cotenant's interest in the common property, as effectual to pass the
interest of the grantor in that specific part of the land"s with the result
of making the grantee a tenant in common with the other cotenants.
The grantee in this case takes the chance that upon partition he or
the grantor may not be awarded the particular interest, and as he has
no greater rights than his grantor, he may not demand the particular
portion upon a partition action." Still other jurisdictions treat such
a conveyance as not void, but voidable at the election of an objecting
or non-conveying cotenant.28 This seems to be the least acceptable
of the various views taken by the courts, as normally in these juris-
2 Benedict v. Torrent, 83 Mich. 181, 47 N.W. 129 (1890); Southern Ins. Co. v.
Postal Telegraph-Cable Co., 156 N.C. 259, 72 S.E. 361 (1911); FREEIAN, COTENANCyt
& PARTITION, 198-203 (2d ed. 1886).
23 Adams v. Briggs Iron Co., 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 361 (1850).
24 Nelson v. Bergman, 146 Tenn. 376, 242 S.W. 387 (1922) ; Lee v. Follensby, 83
Vt 35, 74 Atl. 327 (1909).
25 Southern Ins. Co. v. Postal Telegraph-Cable Co., 156 N.C. 259, 72 S.E. 361
(1911).
-O Virginia Coal & Iron Co. v. Hylton, 115 Va. 418, 79 S.E. 337 (1913) ; Woods v.
Early, 95 Va. 307, 28 S.E. 374 (1897).
-7 Swartzbaugh v. Sampson, 11 Cal. App. 451, 54 P.2d 73 (Dist. Ct. App. 1936).
- Pellow v. Arctic Mining Co., 164 Mich. 87, 128 N.W. 918 (1910); Young v.
Young, 307 Mo. 218, 270 S.W. 653 (1925) ; Barnhart v. Campbell, 50 Mo. 597 (1872).
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dictions the non-conveying cotenant must do some act to ratify the
action of the conveying cotenant.2 9 Under the usual rules of agency,
for a ratification of the agent's acts by the principal to occur, the agent
must be purporting to act as an agent. But where the cotenant con-
veys, purporting to pass his own good title to the land, he is not acting
as an agent for the other cotenants. Moreover, to allow the non-
participating cotenants' interest to change hands by a conveyance by
one cotenant violates the Statute of Frauds which requires the con-
veyance of an interest in land to be in writing."0
In regard to conveyances by a cotenant of his interest (corporeal
or incorporeal) in a particular portion, which is less than the grantor's
interest in the whole of the common estate, subject to the grantor's
being awarded that portion on partition, a minority of the states take
the position that such a grant is absolutely nugatory except between
the grantor and the grantee.3' A majority of the courts will allow the
grantee to become a tenant in common with the other cotenants as to
the particular interest.3 Of course these new tenants in common have
restricted rights; since they hold under the right of their grantor,
they may not be awarded any of the specific portion upon partition.
The better view seems to be that where the cotenant attempts to
convey either the whole of the specific tract or just his undivided
interest in the common property, the grantee should succeed to his
grantor's undivided interest in that portion. This would further the
free alienation of property, and would not place too great a burden
upon the other tenants. The other cotenants will have an undivided
share of the estate upon partition, and the acts of the one cotenant
cannot prejudice their rights. If the conveyance of the specific portion
is treated as a conveyance of the grantor's interest therein, which may
amount to nothing upon partition, there is no danger that the common
tract will be divided into small parcels. The same result could be
achieved by requesting partition, but this may not be desirable under
the terms of the grant creating the joint ownership.
Under the old common law rules, the creation of multitudinous
tenancies in common in a particular portion or interest in an estate
made partition in kind difficult or impossible, and partition in kind
was the only partition available. The jurisdictions allowing the co-
29 Note 28 supra.
30 2 TIIFAux, REAL PROPERTY § 454 (3d ed. 1939).
31 Lucas v. Ferris, 95 Conn. 619, 112 At. 165 (1921) ; Barnes v. Lynch, 151 Mass.
510,24 N.E. 783 (1890).
32 Pearce v. Third Ave. Imp. Co., 221 Ala. 209, 128 So. 396 (1930) ; Middlecoff v.
Cronise, 155 Cal. 185, 100 Pac. 232 (1909).
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tenant to pass an interest in a specific portion of the common estate
do so under the modern practice, and where partition in kind is difficult
or impossible, the land can be sold and the proceeds divided among
the parties according to their respective rights. It is generally held,
however, that a conveyance of more than the joint tenant owns (more
than his undivided share) is effective to convey his undivided interest
only.33
There is one exception taken by the states which recognize the
validity of the conveyance by one tenant of a specific portion of the
common property. This is the grant of an easement: It is generally
held that one cotenant may not, without the joinder of the other co-
tenants, grant an easement in the common land."' A grant of an ease-
ment is an attempt by one cotenant, not to substitute another cotenant
in his place, as in the case of a conveyance or a lease, but to enable
a person not a cotenant to interfere, perhaps perpetually, with the
possession of the other cotenants.
LEASES
One tenant may lease his whole interest in the common tract, but
the lease by him of the whole estate cannot deprive the other cotenants
of their rights. The lessee succeeds to the right of the cotenant under
whom he holds, and he becomes a tenant in common with the other
cotenants. 5 The tenant holding under the lease may recover posses-
sion of the entire tract against anyone except a cotenant,"8 and a co-
tenant has no right to oust a person who holds possession with the
consent of another cotenant."s If the cotenant attempts to lease a
specific portion of the common tract, the lease is a valid lease of the
cotenant's interest in that portion,"8 but does not bind the other co-
tenants unless they have shared in or compelled an accounting for
the rents received." In states which hold that the cotenant cannot
33 Highland Park Mfg. Co. v. Steele, 232 Fed. 10 (4th Cir. 1916); Giddens v. Red-
doch, 207 Ala. 297, 92 So. 848 (1921).
34 Pfeiffer v. University of Cal., 74 Cal. 156, 15 Pac. 622 (1887); Forrest Milling
Co. v. Cedar Falls Milling Co., 103 Iowa 619, 72 N.W. 1076 (1897) ; Silverman v. Betti,
222 Mass. 142, 109 N.E. 947 (1915) ; Palmer v. Palmer, 150 N.Y. 139, 44 N.E. 996
(1896) ; Thomas v. Morgan, 113 Okla. 212, 240 Pac. 735 (1925).
-25 Geary v. Taylor, 166 Ky. 501, 179 SAV. 426 (1915) ; Satterlee v. Umenthum, 47
S.D. 372, 198 N.W. 823 (1924).
36 Verdier v. Verdier, 152 Cal. App. 2d 348, 313 P.2d 123 (Dist. Ct. App. 1957);
Swartzbaugh v. Sampson, 11 Cal. App. 2d 451, 54 P.2d 73 (Dist. Ct. App. 1936) ; Wa-
terford Irr. Dist. v. Turlock Irr. Dist., 50 Cal. App. 213, 194 Pac. 757 (Dist. Ct. App.
1920).
37 Lee Chuck v. Quan Wo Chong & Co., 91 Cal. 593, 28 Pac. 45 (1891).
3' Davis v. Byrd, 238 Mo. App. 581, 185 S.W.2d 866 (1945).39 Jewel Tea Co. v. Eagle Realty Co., 70 F. Supp. 918 (D. Neb. 1947) ; Nelson v.
Wentworth, 243 Mass. 377, 137 N.E. 646 (1923).
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convey a specific portion of the common property, as a corollary, he
may not lease a specific portion of the common land."
WASTE
Generally at common law there was no action that a cotenant could
maintain against his fellow cotenants for waste. The Statute of West-
minister II, 1285, 13 Edw. 1, c. 22 changed the English law to allow
for such action. Many states have enacted similar statutes, and the
Washington provision is found in RCW 64.12.020,41 allowing for an
action between cotenants for waste committed on real property. The
Washington statute provides for treble damages as a remedy.
Although most states provide a statutory remedy for a cotenant in
the event of waste committed on the property by a fellow cotenant
(and those that do not, usually rely upon the Statute of Westminister
as giving such a remedy under the common law), there is not a good
definition or any common agreement of what constitutes waste between
cotenants. Waste is a term usually defined as an abuse or destruction
of property by one rightfully in possession resulting in a permanent
injury to the inheritance." The basis for determining that waste has
been committed is that the actions of the occupier of the land are
inconsistent with the limitations of his estate. Thus it is easy to see
why many of the courts have difficulty deciding whether there has
been waste committed by a cotenant in fee. If a man is the owner of
an estate in fee (even though he is a cotenant), his use of the land
should not be restricted, nor should he be held accountable for such
use, as long as he does not exceed a standard for a reasonable fee
owner. Application of this reasoning to a joint tenant in fee would
lead to the conclusion that his use of the land would be unimpeachable
for waste, except possibly for equitable waste. The English rule is
nearly in accord with this position, and it has been held that such a
co-owner in fee has the right to use and enjoy the common property
in any reasonable way, so long as he does not exclude his cotenants
from the same use and enjoyment.43
Many American courts agree with the English view, and hold that
40 Medina Oil Development Co. v. Murphy, 233 S.W. 333 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921).
41 See Cross, The Amendment of the Waste Statute-Retrogresson, 21 NVASH. L.
Rmv. 31 (1946).
42 Halifax Drainage Dist. v. Gleaton, 137 Fla. 397, 188 So. 374 (1939) ; Thayer v.
Shorey, 287 Mass. 76, 191 N.E. 435 (1934).
4sJob v. Patton L.R. 20 Eq. 84 (1872) ; Martyn v. Knowllys, 8 T.R. 145, 101 Eng.
Rep. 1313 (K.B. 1799) ; 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 6.15 (1952).
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a cotenant has the same right to reasonable use and enjoyment of the
property as he would have as the sole owner in fee.4 It has, however,
been held waste to pull down a sawmill owned in common, or to re-
move machinery from a mill owned in common and place it in another
mill.'0
In other jurisdictions, the courts evidently feel that allowing a co-
tenant to use and occupy the land as if he were the sole owner in fee
is inconsistent with his particular position as a co-owner, and violates
the rights of his cotenants. This is especially apparent in the cases
dealing with mines, quarries, and timber lands. In these cases there
is little uniformity. In most of the cases, the courts allow the con-
tinued operation of a mining project or oil well if the land was used
for that purpose when the joint ownership was created." The real
difficulty arises over the right of a cotenant to open a new mine or
develop and drill a new oil well, or to cut timber. In most of these
cases, these courts apply the test for waste that is normally applied
to a life tenant, forgetting that the cotenants are actually tenants in
fee. Thus it has been held that a cotenant individually may not open
a new mine, 8 drill a new oil well,"3 or cut timber upon the land? The
courts' reasoning appears to be that the unilateral action of one tenant
should not be allowed to diminish the value of the common estate, and
even if the minerals or timber do not represent the principal value of
the land, their use is a destruction and waste of the inheritance of the
other tenants. This reasoning, of course, ignores the fact that the
cotenant in fee has an ownership interest in the land, and it may be
that the only way he can benefit from his ownership is through such
exploitation. Where a non-acting cotenant is dissatisfied with the ex-
ploitation of the land, he may seek partition to protect his interests.
It seems that a more reasonable rule would be the English one, that
the cotenant with a fee interest should have the rights of a reasonable
fee owner, subject only to the rights of his cotenants. In practice, many
of the courts that call such use of the land waste follow this procedure,
and although the cutting of timber, mining of the land, or taking of
44 Bucbanan v. Jencks, 38 R.I. 443, 96 Atl. 307 (1916) ; Gillum v. St. Louis A. & T.
Ry., 5 Tex. Civ. App. 338, 23 S.W. 717 (Ct. Civ. App. 1893).
45 Maddon v. Goddarce, 15 Me. 218 (1839).
40 Symond v. Harris, 51 Me. 14 (1862).
47 Prairie Oil & Gas Co. v. Allen, 2 F.2d 566 (8th Cir. 1924) ; Howard v. Manning,
79 Okla. 165, 192 Pac. 358 (1920).
" Abbey v. Wheeler, 170 N.Y. 122, 62 N.E. 1074 (1902).
40 Williamson v. Jones, 43 W. Va. 562, 27 S.E. 411 (1897).
ro Provident Life & Trust Co. v. Wood, 96 W. Va. 516, 123 S.E. 276 (1924).
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oil is called waste, the tenant committing such violations is held ac-
countable only for net profits realized from such operations, and not
for the treble damages that could be awarded.5'
OUSTER
Ouster refers to the act of one cotenant in depriving the other co-
tenant of his rights to possession of the land under such circumstances
that the tenant who is in possession would, if that possession continued
for the statutory period, acquire title by adverse possession.2 Under
normal circumstances the possession of one cotenant is the possession
of all the cotenants; hence exclusive possession by one tenant alone
is not sufficient for an ouster.5 The further acts required are most
commonly either the exclusion of the cotenant demanding access to
the land or a denial of his title.5 This may result even though the
exclusion is from a smaller part of the land than that of the excluder's
share,5" or where the cotenant in possession purports to convey exclu-
sive title under a claim of exclusive right."8 In such cases the ousted
tenant must have knowledge of such acts on the part of the cotenant; "
also, in the case where the cotenant in possession claims to be the sole
owner, his cotenants are not ousted unless they have adequate knowl-
edge of his claims.5" However, in the case of a grantee of a cotenant,
holding under a deed purporting to convey the entire tract, no actual
notice is necessary, and the grantee's open and notorious possession
and recording of the deed is adequate to constitute an ouster and
commence the running of the statute of limitations against the other
cotenants.5" The question of whether one cotenant's acts actually
amount to an ouster is normally one for a jury under the proper
instruction of the court.60
51 Guest v. Guest, 234 Ala. 581, 176 So. 289 (1937) ; Williams v. Bruton, 133 S.C.
395, 131 S.E. 18 (1925).
52 Struzinski v. Struzinsky, 133 Conn. 424, 52 A.2d 2 (1947).
53 Church v. State, 65 Wash. 50, 117 Pac. 711 (1911).
5 4 Cameron v. Chicago M. & St. P. Ry., 60 Minn. 100, 61 N.W. 814 (1895).
55 Susquehanna Transmission Co. v. St. Clair, 113 Md. 667, 77 Ati. 1119 (1910);
Muskeget Island Club v. Prior, 228 Mass. 95, 117 N.E. 2 (1917).
56 Saulsberry v. Maddix, 125 F.2d 430 (6th Cir. 1942) ; Layton v. Campbell, 155 Ala.
220, 46 So. 775 (1908) ; Ogelsby v. Hollester, 76 Cal. 136, 18 Pac. 146 (1888).
57 Tillotson v. Foster, 310 Ill. 52, 141 N.E. 412 (1923) ; Acton v. Lamberson, 102
Ore. 472,202 Pac. 421 (1921). Washington apparently requires that the one tenant have
actual notice of the other's adverse claim. McKnight v. Basilides, 19 Wn.2d 391, 143
P.2d 307 (1943). But see Cox v. Tompkinson, 39 Wash. 70, 80 Pac. 1005 (1905).
58 Saucier v. Kremer, 297 Mo. 461, 249 S.W. 640 (1923).
59 Prescott v. Nevers, 19 Fed. Cas. 1286 (No. 11390) (C.C.D. Me. 1827); Broad-
water v. Parker, 209 Ga. 801, 76 S.E.2d 402 (1953) ; Parker v. Proprietors of Locks
& Canals, 44 Mass. (3 Met.) 91 (1841).
60 Hare v. Chisman, 230 Ind. 333, 101 N.E.2d 268 (1951).
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The remedy of an ousted tenant is ejectment with an accompanying
action for mesne profits. Judgment for the plaintiff in such an action
does not oust the defendant from possession of the land, but only affirms
the plaintiff in his rights to possession in common with the defendant.61
RENTS, PROFITS AN ACCOUNTING
The original common law was that a cotenant could not be made
to account to his fellow cotenants for the use and occupation of and
appropriations of rents and profits from the common land unless his
acts amount to an ouster or unless he has agreed to act as bailiff for
them. The English law was changed by the Act of Anne, 1705, c. 16,
§ 27, which purported to make a cotenant liable to his cotenants for
the excess of rents and profits over and above his fair share. The
English courts, however, construed the statute narrowly, and applied
it only where the cotenant had received rents from a third person.
The Act of Anne has been considered a part of the common law of
the United States, but its application has not been uniform. The
largest number of jurisdictions, like the English courts, make a narrow
application of the Act of Anne (or similar statutes, locally enacted),
and normally hold that there is no liability on the part of a cotenant
in possession to account to his fellow cotenants for his use and occu-
pation of the common premises, even though he takes all the rents and
profits.62 A few jurisdictions construe the act so as to make a cotenant
in possession liable for use and occupation on the basis of its rental
value and profits,63 as long as these are not the result of the labor and
invested capital of the cotenant in possession. Almost all jurisdictions
recognize that the tenant will be liable for the use, occupation, and
profits of the common premises, if the action of the tenant in possession
amounts to an ouster of the other tenants."
The Washington position on the question of accounting for rents
and profits is not clear. The supreme court apparently first took the
position that a tenant in sole possession was not liable for the use,
61 Clay v. Field, 115 U.S. 260 (1885).
62 Dabney-Johnston Oil Corp. v. Walden, 4 Cal.2d 637, 52 P.2d 237 (1935) ; Hill v.
Jones, 118 Conn. 12, 170 At. 154 (1934) ; Washington County Irr. Dist. v. Talboy, 55
Idaho 382, 43 P.2d 943 (1935) ; Thrustin v. Brown, 83 Kan. 125, 109 Pac. 784 (1910);
Fenton v. Wendell, 116 Mich. 45, 74 N.W. 384 (1898) ; Sons v. Sons, 151 Minn. 360,
186 N.W. 811 (1922) ; Tolen v. Tolen, 96 N.J. Eq. 496, 126 Atl. 211 (1924) ; Eysen-
bach v. Naharkey, 110 Okla. 207,236 Pac. 619 (1925).
63 Larmon v. Larmon, 173 Ky. 477, 191 S.W. 110 (1917); Daniel v. Daniel, 106
Wash. 659, 181 Pac. 215 (1919).
64 Johnson v. Covington, 148 Tenn. 47, 251 S.W. 893 (1923); 14 Am. Jui. Cot enancy§ 34 (1938).
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occupation, rents, and profits of the common land, absent an agree-
ment to the contrary, unless the cotenant out of possession had made
a demand therefor, and the possessing cotenant's liability, if any, com-
menced at the time that the demand was made. 5 Subsequently, the
court apparently changed its position in McKnight v. Basilides,0 where
the defendant was a tenant in common with his stepchildren. The
defendant had the exclusive possession and use of the common property
for a period of 13 years, when the plaintiffs brought an action for
partition and accounting. The court decided first that no adverse
possession had been perfected against the plaintiffs since there had
been no ouster (the plaintiffs had no actual notice of the defendant's
claim to exclusive title); it then decided that it was inequitable to
follow the general rule that a cotenant is not liable to his cotenants
for his use and occupation of the property owned in common, and
so held that he should pay for his personal use of that part of the
property owned by his cotenants.
Fulton v. Fulton7 is a recent Washington case involving an action
by two brothers for partition of property once held in partnership,
since dissolved, and at the time of the action held in tenancy in com-
mon. In the action, one brother asked for an accounting for the other's
use and occupation of a portion of the property, the plaintiff relying
upon the McKnight case. The court followed the general rule that one
tenant was not liable to cotenants for use and occupation of the com-
mon land, relying upon American Law Reports for authority, the court
quoting in part from the passage:
The rule which prevails in the majority of jurisdictions, founded on
the plainest principles of property ownership, is that, absent statute
construed to work a different result, . . . a tenant in common, joint
tenant, or coparcener who has enjoyed occupancy of the common
premises or some part thereof is not liable to pay rent to the others
therefore, or to account to them respecting the reasonable value of his
occupancy, where they have not been ousted or excluded nor their
equal rights denied, and no agreement to pay for the occupancy . . .s
The Washington court then harmonized its result in the Fulton case
with the result in the McKnight case by referring to the court's express
65 Leake v. Hayes, 13 Wash. 213, 43 Pac. 48 (1895).
66 19 Wn.2d 391, 143 P.2d 307 (1943).
07 57 Wn.2d 331, 357 P.2d 169 (1960).
68 Annot., 51 A.L.R.2d 388, 413 (1957). See also, People ex tel. Breene v. Dist. Ct.
of Lake County, 27 Colo. 465, 62 Pac. 206 (1900) ; Sons v. Sons, 151 Minn. 360, 186
N.W. 811 (1922) ; Kelly v. Dierks, 131 Okla. 217, 268 Pac. 193 (1928) ; 2 TIFFANY,
REAL PROPERTY § 450 (3d ed. 1939) ; 14 Am. Jur- Cotenancy § 34 (1938).
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disapproval of the majority rule in that case as dicta, and holding that
the facts of the McKnight case put it squarely within the provisions
of the above quoted general rule, as, in the view of the court in the
Fulton case, the possession of the defendant in the McKnight case
was sole and exclusive. Admittedly the possession of the defendant
in the McKnight case was sole and exclusive, but the facts stated in
that case indicate that the defendant had not denied the rights of the
plaintiffs, nor had he excluded them from the premises.
During the time from the death of his wife, Alice, until a few days prior
to the beginning of this action, appellant (the defendant) never made
any claim to respondents that he was the sole owner of the property,
nor did the respondents make any claim to the property during the
same period.69
The end result in the Fulton case seems the most desirable under
the circumstances, since the cotenant owns an undivided share in the
property, and is entitled to the possession of it in part or in whole,
as long as he does not interfere with the rights of the other cotenants.
His sole and exclusive possession is entirely by the leave of the other
cotenants, and if they choose not to demand their rights, there seems
no reason why the cotenant in possession should be required to pay
for the exercise of his own rights. Because of the court's intent ex-
pressed in Fulton to put Washington in the majority position, it is
probably safe to say that henceforth in Washington, a cotenant will
not be liable to his cotenants for use and occupation of the common
premises, unless his actions amount to an ouster. Nevertheless, since
the McKnight case, where no ouster in the normal sense occurred, is
still the law, it may be that the court in the Fulton case was attempting
to redefine ouster to mean only exclusive possession.
There seems to be a few exceptions to the general rule that a co-
tenant is not liable to his other cotenants for profits realized during
his sole and exclusive use and occupation of the land. Under the
reasoning that the Act of Anne was designed to prevent one cotenant
from reducing the value of the other shares, many American courts
have found that the tenant in possession is accountable to the other
tenants for their shares of the profits, when his activities producing
profits had the effect of a permanent reduction in value of the land.
Thus a tenant in possession, without an ouster of his cotenants, has
0 McKnight v. Basilides, 19 Wn.2d 391, 393, 143 P2d 307, 308 (1943).
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been held liable to them where he operates a mine or quarry,"0 recovers
oil, 1 or cuts timber. 2 In addition, it has been held that a joint tenant
may be entitled to compensation to the extent that profits from the
land have been increased by his own personal and private improve-
ments upon the land, even though he is not in possession."
CONTRIBUTIONS
Carrying Charges of the Property. Where one cotenant has satis-
fied a debt in the form of a lien or an assessment against the common
property or pays the necessary carrying charges of the property, such
as taxes and insurance, he is entitled to contribution from his cotenants
as a matter of right for their proportionate share of the amount paid.7
As to repairs, there is a division of authority. If allowed, normally
they must be necessary for the preservation of a building or other
erection on the land rather than just desirable."5 The cotenant wishing
to make the repairs and wishing to get a contribution from his fellow
cotenants must make a demand upon the cotenants to join with him
in making the repairs, and the cotenants' refusal to do so makes them
open to demand for contribution once the repairs have been com-
pleted."6 In some states and in England, the rule still is that contribu-
tion will not be exacted even though the expenditure was absolutely
necessary for the preservation of the property."7
It seems that the right of a cotenant to contributions should depend
on who had possession of the land during the period for which con-
tribution is sought. If a cotenant does choose to make use of his right
to sole possession and use, it seems reasonable to expect that he should
7 0 Silver King Coalition Mines Co. v. Silver King Consol. Mining Co., 204 Fed. 166
(8th Cir. 1913) ; McChord v. Oakland Quicksilver Mining Co., 64 Cal. 134, 27 Pac. 863
(1883) ; White v. Smyth, 142 Tex. 272, 214 S.W.2d 967 (1948).
71 Davis v. Atlantic Oil Products Co., 87 F.2d 75, (5th Cir. 1936) ; Payne v. Calla-
han, 37 Cal. App. 2d 503, 99 P.2d 1050 (Dist Ct App. 1940).
72 Guest v. Guest, 234 Ala. 581, 176 So. 289 (1937) ; Williams v. Bruton, 133 S.C.
395, 131 S.E. 18 (1925).
73 Combs v. Ritter, 100 Cal. App. 2d 315, 223 P.2d 505 (Dist. Ct. App. 1950).
74 Willmon v. Koyer, 168 Cal. 369, 143 Pac. 694 (1914) ; Botkin v. Pyle, 91 Colo.
221, 14 P.2d 187 (1932) ; Rippe v. Badger, 125 Iowa 725, 101 N.W. 642 (1904) ; Hoyt
v. Lightbody, 98 Minn. 189, 108 N.W. 843 (1906); Bates v. Hamilton, 144 Mo. 1, 45
S.W. 641 (1898) ; Carson v. Broady, 56 Neb. 648, 77 N.W. 80 (1898).
75 Connolly v. McLeod, 217 Miss. 231, 63 So. 2d 845 (1953) ; Moore v. Maes, 214
S.C. 274, 52 S.E.2d 204 (1949) ; 2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 461 (3d ed. 1939).
76 re Real Estate of Cochran, 31 Del. Ch. 368, 66 A,2d 497 (Orphans Ct. 1949);
Keyser v. Morehead, 23 Idaho 501, 130 Pac. 992 (1913) ; Cooper v. Brown, 143 Iowa
482, 122 N.W. 144 (1909) ; Moss v. Rose, 27 Ore. 595, 41 Pac. 666 (1895) ; Duplesse v.
Haskell, 89 Vt. 166, 94 Ati. 503 (1915). Some cases suggest that no actual request to
the other tenants need be made, but that such request and obligation is implied in the
nature of the cotenancy. See Keyser v. Morehead, 23 Idaho 507, 130 Pac. 992 (1913);
Crawford v. Weidemann, 170 Ky. 613, 186 S.W. 509 (1916).
77 Cosgriff v. Foss, 152 N.Y. 104,46 N.E. 307 (1897).
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pay the normal charges of the land, such as insurance, taxes and
ordinary repairs, at least to the extent that these do not exceed the
value of the use of the land. This is especially true of joint tenants,
who always stand in a fiduciary relationship, so that one should not
profit at the expense of the others. The courts, however, do not always
concern themselves with the question of who has had possession of
the land during the period of time for which contribution is sought,
although it is generally held that the cotenant in possession must use
the profits from the land for the payment of the normal carrying
charges. It has also been held that where all of the cotenants are in
possession recovery may be had,"8 and where none of the tenants is
in possession recovery may be had, as there is an equal duty to main-
tain the land." When the tenant in sole possession has paid all of the
carrying costs, and the value of the use and enjoyment of the land
which he has had equals or exceeds such payments, no action against
the other cotenants for the contribution will be allowed. 0 If the
tenant has ousted his cotenants, no right to contribution is allowed."
When the tenant in possession refuses to account for rents and profits,
again no action is allowed.82 But in all cases, where a cotenant is
chargeable for rent he may set off against such claims the normal
carrying charges that he has paid.
When a tenant has a claim for carrying charges or repairs, he
ordinarily does not have a right of personal recovery against his co-
tenants; his remedy is to offset his claim in a suit by his other tenants
for an accounting for rents and profits, or in the alternative, to enforce
an equitable lien upon the interests of his fellow cotenants in the
land. 3 In the event that the cotenant has paid off a mortgage or other
78 Conley v. Sharpe, 58 Cal. App. 2d 145, 136 P.2d 376 (Dist. Ct. App 1943) ;
Hotopp v. Morrison Lodge, 110 Ky. 987, 63 S.W. 44 (1901) ; Howland v. Stowe, 290
Mass. 142, 194 N.E. 888 (1935) ; Newton v. Weiler, 87 Mont. 164, 286 Pac. 133 (1930);
Knesek v. Muzny, 191 OkIa. 332, 129 P.2d 853 (1942).79 Vlancancich v. Kenny, 271 N.Y. 164, 2 N.E.2d 527 (1936).
80 Gordon v. McLemore, 237 Ala. 270, 186 So. 470 (1939) ; Ward v. Pipkin, 181 Ark.
736, 27 SA.2d 523 (1930) ; Finley v. Keene, 136 N.J. Eq. 347, 42 A.2d 208 (1945) ;
Roberts v. Roberts, 136 Tex. 255, 150 S.W.2d 236 (1941). Some jurisdictions will
allow recovery to the occupying tenant where he has paid more than he has received in
benefits. Kirsch v. Scandia American Bank, 160 Minn. 269, 199 N.W. 831 (1924) ;
Gearheart v. Gearheart, 213 S.W. 31 (Mo. Sup. 1919). In other jurisdictions, the
tenant in possession is not allowed recovery, except to offset rents, no matter what
benefits he has received. Gordon v. McLemore, 237 Ala. 270, 186 So. 470 (1939)
Schilbach v. Schilbach, 171 Md. 405, 189 Atl. 432 (1937).81 Victoria Copper Mining Co. v. Rich, 193 Fed. 314 (6th Cir. 1911); Wistar's
Appeal, 125 Pa. 426, 17 Atl. 460 (1889).
112 Jarvis v. Jarvis, 288 Mich. 608, 286 N.W. 96 (1939).83 Johnson v. Washington, 152 Ga. 635, 110 S.E. 889 (1922) ; Hogan v. McMahon,
115 Md. 195, 80 AtI. 695 (1911) ; Hurley v. Hurley, 148 Mass. 444, 19 N.E. 545 (1889) ;
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encumbrance upon the land, he is subrogated to the position of the
mortgagee for the purpose of compelling payment by his cotenants of
their portion,84 and if the payment discharges a lien, equity will keep
it open in order that it may be enforced to compel payment.85 The
general rule seems to be that only where the debt paid was a personal
obligation of the other cotenants will the paying cotenant have a per-
sonal action against them.8"
There are a few courts which do allow a personal judgment against
the cotenants in an action based upon the right to contribution, but
usually these recoveries are allowed in different types of actions, such
as assumpsit, rather than in an action for contribution or partition."'
Other states will only allow charges such as taxes and insurance paid
by a tenant in possession as a setoff in a claim for rent."8 In such a
case no lien may be had on the cotenant's interest and no personal
judgment may be had against him.
The denial of personal recovery against a cotenant where the con-
tribution is allowed raises a peculiar problem in the case of a joint
tenant. If allowance for contribution is only a lien upon the cotenant's
interest, upon the nonpaying tenant's death the paying joint tenant
will only have a lien upon his own property, probably resulting in a
merger and loss of the lien, whereas, a tenant in common would still
have a lien upon the interest of the deceased tenant. At first glance
this would appear to be a just result, since the joint tenant survivor
now owns an entire interest in the land, and supposedly has the whole
benefit of any sums expended upon the property. But a closer analysis
discloses the fallacy of this assumption, for the deceased tenant during
his life has all the advantages of such sums put into the land, and, in
the case of taxes and some repairs, the only benefit derived was during
Stone v. Marshall, 52 Wash. 375, 100 Pac. 858 (1909) ; Leake v. Hayes, 13 Wash. 213,
43 Pac. 48 (1895). But an equitable lien will not be allowed one cotenant against the
interest of another where third parties will be adversely affected. Aylward v. Lally,
147 Wash. 29,264 Pac. 983 (1928).
84 Scanlon v. Parish, 85 Conn. 379, 82 Atl. 969 (1912); Thurston v. Holden, 45
Idaho 724, 265 Pac. 697 (1928) ; Hansen v. Cerro Gordo State Bank, 209 Iowa 1352,
230 N.W. 415 (1930) ; Olson v. Chapman, 4 Wn.2d 522, 104 P.2d 344 (1940) ; Robin-
son v. Robinson, 14 Wn.2d 98, 126 P.2d 1090 (1942).
85 Parsons v. Urie, 104 Md. 238, 64 AtI. 927 (1906) ; Flack v. Gosnell, 76 Md. 88, 24
Atl. 414 (1892).
86 Thurston v. Holden, 45 Idaho 724, 265 Pac. 697 (1928) ; Tucker v. Whittlesey,
74 Wis. 74, 41 N.W. 535 (1889) ; 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 6.17 (Casner ed.
1952).
87 Lach v. Weber, 123 N.J. Eq. 303, 197 AUt. 417 (1938) ; Weible, Accountability of
Tenants, 29 IowA L. REv. 558 (1944).
88 Gordon v. McLemore, 237 Ala. 270, 186 So. 470 (1939) ; Ward v. Pipkin, 181
Ark. 736, 27 S.W.2d 523 (1930) ; Succession of Czarnowski, 151 La. 754, 92 So. 325
(1922).
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the life of this tenant. In addition, if a lien had been placed upon his
interest, a court must have already decided that he owed the amount,
and it seems unjust that he should escape payment simply because the
court, to protect him from exorbitant charges and give him the option
of paying the amount he owes or forfeiting his interest, limits his
liability to a lien upon his interest in the land. The non-paying tenant
had the possibility of being the survivor, and if he had survived, the
lien of the paying cotenant would survive and could be enforced. There
appears to be a dearth of authority upon this question, at least in-
volving joint tenants. One case, Ratte v. Ratte,"9 even disallowed re-
covery from the estate of a deceased joint tenant for the amount of a
mortgage paid by the survivor after the death of the other, upon which
the deceased tenant was personally liable. The question has been
answered more directly in cases involving surviving spouses of tenants
by the entireties, there being a division of authority on allowing re-
covery by the survivor. Some courts feel that the deceased spouse
had the benefits of the land during his life, and should not escape
the obligations to contribute for rents, profits, and repairs simply by
death."0 Other courts feel that since the surviving spouse has the
whole of the former common property, the allowance of a recovery
would be unjust enrichment." The Washington court apparently has
not made a decision on the question, but since personal recoveries for
payments of taxes are limited by statute to persons not claiming owner-
ship of the real property,92 it seems doubtful that a personal recovery
can be had by a cotenant in fee.
Although there are many factors to be considered, the most just
result seems to be that where both joint tenants have enjoyed the use
of the land during the duration of the tenancy, one tenant should not
be allowed to escape his obligations for the normal carrying charges
of the land during the period of co-ownership, simply by death. A re-
covery should be allowed in such a case.
Improvements. A cotenant may not compel his fellow tenants to
89 260 Mass. 165, 156 N.E. 870 (1927).
00 In re Keil's Estate, 51 Del. (1 Storey) 351, 145 A.2d 563 (Sup. Ct. 1958) ; Cun-
ningham v. Cunningham, 158 Md. 372, 148 Atl. 444 (1930) ; Nobile v. Barletta, 109
N.J. Eq. 119, 156 AtI. 483 (1931) ; In re Dowler's Estate, 368 Pa. 519, 84 A.2d 209(1951) ; In re Kershaw's Estate, 352 Pa. 205,42 A2d 538 (1945).
91 Durlacher v. First Nat. Bank, 100 So. 2d 73 (Fla. App. 1958) ; Lopez v. Lopez,
90 So. 2d 456 (Fla. App. 1956) ; Florio v. Greenspan, 165 N.E.2d 753 (Mass. 1960);
Ratte v. Ratte, 260 Mass. 165, 156 N.E. 870 (1927).
92 RCW 84.56.320. See Olson v. Chapman, 4 Wn.2d 522, 104 P.2d 344 (1940), limit-
ing the application of this statute to persons not having an ownership interest in the
land.
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contribute toward the cost of improvements he makes upon the land
which are not necessary for its repair, and he is not allowed credit for
them in an accounting action for rents and profits,93 provided there
is no express or implied contract to that effect. If one tenant were
allowed to make improvements on the land chargeable to his cotenants
according to their respective shares, the one tenant might well improve
his cotenants out of their share of the property by building improve-
ments which would benefit himself much, but benefit the land little.
If the improving tenant were allowed to offset the value of the im-
provements in an action for accounting of rents or profits, he might
deprive his fellow tenants of any income or benefit from the property
for years.
Of course, the non-allowance of improvements places an additional
burden upon the improving tenant and frequently is inequitable,
especially when the improvements are needed for the most beneficial
use of the land. Recognizing this, the courts have been ready to grant
such relief to the improving tenant as is possible without doing injury
to his fellow tenants. Accordingly, in partition actions, the courts will
determine and allow the improving tenant the amount that the im-
provements have enhanced the value of the land at its sale," or, if the
land can be divided the courts will attempt to give the improving
tenant the portion of the land with the improvements on it.9" Of course,
none of these remedies are available to the improving tenant where
the court determines that the improvements were made for the pur-
pose of improving the other tenants out of their share or causing them
to abandon their interest." There is some authority that Washington,
in a minority position, will allow contribution for improvements en-
hancing the value of the property."7
An additional problem arises in the case of an accounting for rent.
Since the improvements normally become part of the land, all of the
93Ward v. Pipkin, 181 Ark. 736, 27 S.W.2d 523 (1930) ; Higgins v. Eva, 204 Cal.
231, 267 Pac. 1081 (1928) ; Barry v. Barry, 147 Neb. 1067, 26 N.W.2d 1 (1947) ; Elling
v. Kohler, 150 Okla. 129, 3 P.2d 161 (1931) ; Cobbett v. Gallagher, 339 Pa. 231, 13 A.2d
403 (1940) ; Minder v. Mottaz, 37 Wash. 474, 79 Pac. 996 (1905) ; Binning v. Miller,
55 Wyo. 478, 102 P.2d 64 (1940).
94 Klein v. Maddox, 59 Cal. App. 2d 141, 138 P.2d 28 (Dist. Ct. App. 1943) ; Fenton
v. Wendell, 116 Mich. 45, 74 N.W. 384 (1898) ; DeBusk v. Guffee, 171 S.W.2d 194
(Tex. Civ. App. 1943) ; Kubina v. Nichols, 241 Wis. 644, 6 N.W.2d 657 (1942).
95 Hamlin v. Hamlin, 90 Wash. 467, 156 Pac. 393 (1916) ; 1 A.L.R. 1193 (1919).9 6 Wolfe v. Childs, 42 Colo. 121, 94 Pac. 292 (1908) ; Cosgriff v. Foss, 152 N.Y. 104,
46 N.E. 307 (1897) ; Moore v. Thorpe, 16 R.I. 655, 19 Atl. 321 (1889).
97 In re Foster's Estate, 139 Wash. 224, 246 Pac. 290 (1926). However, the state-
ment by the court that contribution is allowed for improvements actually enhancing the
value of the land was not necessary for the decision in the case.
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cotenants share in their ownership."8 Should the improving tenant in
sole occupation be required to account to his cotenants for the reason-
able rental value of the improvements he has made? It seems in-
equitable to charge the tenant for the improvements he himself has
made, adding to the benefit of the other tenants at no cost to them.
The rule seems to be that the rental value will be determined by the
value of the property without the improvements." However, some-
what inconsistently, it is the rule that one tenant may not charge his
cotenants for personal services connected with the common property.10
DALE E. KEMER
11 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 6.18 (Casner ed. 1952).00 Hanna v. Carver, 121 Ind. 278, 23 N.E. 93 (1889) ; Raferty v. Monahan, 22 R.I.
558, 48 Atl. 940 (1901) ; Cain v. Cain, 53 S.C. 350, 31 S.E. 278 (1898) ; Williamson v.
Jones, 43 W. Va. 562, 27 S.E. 411 (1897).
100 Harry v. Harry, 127 Ind. 91, 26 N.E. 562 (1891) ; Sharp v. Zeller, 114 La. 549,
38 So. 449 (1905) ; Von Herberg v. Von Herberg, 6 Wn.2d 100, 106 P.2d 737 (1940).
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